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C HAP T E R 22 
Land Use Law 
RICHARD G. HUBER 
§22.1. Zoning plans: Adoption: Special zoning boards and curative 
statutes. G.L., c. 4OA, §6 prescribes certain procedures which must be 
followed by a municipality to enact or amend a zoning plan. Specifically, 
it requires a hearing, subject to special notice requirements, to be held 
before the planning board, the municipal governing body, or a special 
zoning board appointed by the governing body. The governing body is 
the board of selectmen or the city council. However, in 1936, the town 
of Canton formed a special zoning board by vote of the town meeting. 
The following year the special board proposed a zoning plan, and the 
plan was adopted at the 1937 town meeting. Thirty-one years later, in 
Town of Canton v. Bruno,! the town sought to enjoin the defendants' 
use of a sand and gravel pit which had been operated intermittently in 
a residential area since before the town's first zoning by-law in 1937. 
Whether the defendants could successfully maintain a claim to a pre-
existing use depended upon the validity of the 1937 by-law and the 
effect of subsequent curative legislation. 
Interpreting the language of Section 6,2 the Court agreed with de-
fendant that the special Canton zoning board was not constituted in 
accordance with statutory requirements. The statute plainly requires 
strict adherence, and the town's "substantial compliance" with its pro-
visions did not meet that standard. Accordingly, the Court ruled that 
the town had no jurisdiction to adopt the by-law in 1937. 
However, in 1949 the General Court adopted a curative statute to 
validate the 1936 plan.3 Several factors suggested that the curative statute 
was intended to apply retroactively and, hence, to validate the original 
Canton zoning plan ab initio.4 Therefore, the Court granted the town's 
prayer for injunctive relief. 
RICHARD G. HUBER is the Dean of the Boston College Law School. 
§22.1. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 791, 282 N.E.2d 87. 
2 The adoption of zoning by-laws in 1937 was governed by then G.L., c. 40, 
§27, since recodified as G.L., c. 40A, §6 by Acts of 1968, c. 194. 
3 Acts of 1949, c. 178, § 1 purported to validate the zoning by-laws adopted 
by the town of Canton in 1937. 
4 The Court indicated that a curative statute, by its very nature, is designed 
to rectify defects arising prior to its enactment. Moreover, in this particular case, 
the retroactive thrust of he 1949 enactment was underlined by the fact that, 
if the intent was merely to have a prospective effect, that end could have been 
achieved by simple readoption of the by-law by the town. 
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Although the effect of a curative statute upon actions taken prior to 
its enactment appeared to be a minor issue in Bruno, the Court's ex-
tensive discussion of the effect of such statutes has important implications. 
While the legislature has broad authority to cure certain defects in 
municipal by-laws, there are constitutional limits to its power: 
The Legislature may confirm and validate the action of a town 
which is void by reason of some irregularity or failure to comply 
with the law if the Legislature could have originally authorized the 
action, provided that vested rights are not impaired by the curative 
legislation. . . . A validating act is constitutionally defective, how-
ever, to the extent that it impairs the vested rights of property 
owners.5 (Citations omitted). 
Since property interests are profoundly affected by land use law, it is 
important to preserve public confidence in municipal zoning enactments. 
Zoning by-laws, like other municipal and legislative enactments, are 
therefore accorded a presumption of validity. Inasmuch as the Canton 
by-law had passed muster before the Attorney General6 and had re-
mained unchallenged since 1937 the Court held that "it had at least 
prima facie validity in 1945, when defendants' predecessor in title re-
opened the gravel pit [the use of] which had been discontinued in 1936."7 
Thus, defendants' predecessor in title had no reason to assume that he 
could validly reopen the gravel pit at the time he bought the property, 
and the nonconforming uses exception could therefore not apply. The 
Court posited a rule to govern the interrelationship of nonconforming 
uses, invalid zoning plans and curative legislation: 
We hold that, in the absence of substantial equity, the use of 
land in violation of a zoning by-law or ordinance does not create a 
substantive right on the basis of a nonconforming use if the zoning 
by-law or ordinance is subsequently adjudicated to be invalid be-
cause of a defect in the process of adoption. Nor does subsequent 
legislation which cures retroactively such a defect in the adoption 
of a zoning by-law or ordinance make a use of the land which was 
in violation of the zoning by-law or ordinance, prior to validation, 
a protected nonconforming use.8 
§22.2. Zoning regulations: Amendment: Timing and content of 
notice. The exacting requirements for adoption for zoning by-laws and 
ordinances have been noted above. 1 Similarly detailed procedures are 
5 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 799-800, 282 N.E.2d at 93-94. 
6 Pursuant to G.L., c. 40, §32, town by-laws must be approved by the attorney 
general before they take effect. 
7 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 801, 282 N.E.2d at 94. 
8 Id. at 1170, 284 N.E.2d at 613. 
§22.2. 1 See §22.1, supra. 
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set out for the valid enactment of amendatory legislation.2 These re-
quirements express the strong public policy that the community should 
carefully scrutinize any limitations on land use. 
One of the provisions designed to insure community participation in 
this process is the notice requirement contained in Section 6 of the 
Zoning Enabling Act. If an amendment to a zoning ordinance or by-
law is proposed, notice of the requisite hearings before the planning 
board and the city council or committee involved must be published at 
least fourteen days before the hearing and "once in each of two suc-
cessive weeks."s In Crall v. City of Leominster,4 the Supreme Judicial 
Court was asked to determine the precise meaning of that requirement. 
The planning board notice was published on Saturday and the following 
Monday, and notice of the city council hearing was published on Thurs-
day and the following Monday. The plaintiff claimed that the notices 
were not in "two successive weeks" because the pUiblication intervals were 
only two days and four days respectively. Since the phrase is not defined 
by the Zoning Enabling Act or by other legislation,5 the Court chose to 
construe it according to common understanding as two "calendar" weeks. 
On this basis ,both notices were held to be valid.6 
The Court also rejected the claim that the notices did not specify 
"the subject matter, sufficient for identification," as also required by 
section 6.' The notices for the hearing before the city council clearly 
complied, since they gave a detailed description of the locus. And, al-
though the notices for the hearing before the planning board were 
fragmentary at best, they did refer to a "more fully described plan on 
file in the Planning Board office"8 and that was held sufficient. The 
Court emphasized that notice of a hearing before a planning board is 
not all that important since such a hearing is preliminary and advisory 
only, and a further opportunity to 'be heard would be available before 
the city council. 
Although scrupulously technical adherence to a procedure seems un-
necessary when substantial injustice will not result from a slight deviation, 
some questions arise from the Court's rather casual treatment of the 
issue of the description of the locus. For example, the Court's decision 
in Town of Canton v. Brun09 would seem to be at odds with the proposi-
tion that the planning board hearing has little meaning. And if the 
description requires a trip to examine the planning board's files, one 
may question why the legislature expressly required a description "suffi-
2 G.L., c. 40A, 16. 
3 Id. 
4 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1167, 284 N.E.2d 610. 
5 G.L.,c. 4, 17, cl. Nineteenth, defines "month" and ''year'' but does not 
define "week." 
6 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1170, 284 N.E.2d at 613. 
7 Id. at 1168, 284 N.E.2d at 612. 
8 Id. at 1170,284 N.E.2d at 613. 
9 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 791, 282 N.E.2d 87, noted in 122.1., supra. 
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cient for identification" to be contained in the notice. It may well be 
that the enabling act is itself somewhat redundant in requiring two 
hearings ;10 but if so, the proper remedy is for the legislature to provide. 
In Hallenborg v. Town Clerk,11 the Supreme Judicial Court was con-
fronted with yet another aspect of the notice requirements in Section 6. 
There was no question that the statutory notice requirement of fourteen 
days had not been met in this case. Rather, the issue presented was 
whether the zoning amendment was valid in spite of the notice irregulari-
ties. 
The town of Billerica had, in its by-laws, specified only that the notices 
be published within a ten-day period before the planning board hearing 
and, in 1969, notice of such a hearing was first published thirteen rather 
than fourteen days prior to a hearing on the zoning amendment con-
tested in Hallenborg. Nonetheless, the hearing before the planning board 
was "well attended" and no opposition to the amendment (which per-
mitted the construction of apartments) was registered. The amendment 
was then adopted at the annual town meeting upon the recommendation 
of the planning board. The plaintiff residents and taxpayers of the town 
claimed that the defective notice of the planning board meeting rendered 
the amendment invalid. Accordingly they filed for a writ of mandamus 
to compel the town clerk to enforce the by-law as it had existed prior 
to the amendment. By the time this action was brought, substantial 
progress had already been made in the construction of several of the 
apartment developments which were authorized by the contested zoning 
amendment. The lower court dismissed the writ and this appeal was 
taken. 
The Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the purpose of the hearing 
before the planning board and concurred with the lower court which 
had distinguished the critical nature of notice before a board of appeals' 
decision on a variance or special permit case from the non-critical nature 
of notice before the planning board hearing considering whether to 
recommend a proposed zoning by-law amendment. In the former case, 
notice is especially important because the hearing is essentially adjudica-
tive. In the latter case, the purpose of the hearing is simply to permit 
the public to express views prior to the planning board's recommendation 
to the legislative body of the community. This purpose was substantially 
met despite the error of one day in the notice. The Court agreed that 
this type of notice was, in a jurisdictional sense, directory and not manda-
tory. The error was not intentional and the Court adopted the rule 
of the cases decided before the 1954 passage of the Zoning Enabling 
Act, that failure of notice was critical only upon a showing of sub-
10 See Woods v. City of Newton, 351 Mass. 98, 217 N.E.2d 728 (1966) in 
which the Court upheld single hearings before both the planning board and 
board of aldermen, since both sat separately, if in the same room, and heard 
the same evidence from the public there present. 
11 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1681, 275 N.E.2d 525. 
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stantial prejudice.12 It did recognize that the pre-1954 rule might not 
be controlling in the face of express notice provisions to the contrary in 
the Zoning Enabling Act. But considering equitable principles of fairness, 
the Court still found the notice provisions not a!bsolutely mandatory in 
the present case. 
The Court, however, refused to sustain the lower court's dismissal of 
the petition for a writ of mandamus. Although the plaintiffs had not 
been prejudiced by the notice defect, the fact remained that the zoning 
amendment had been adopted in contravention of the Zoning Enabling 
Act. The petitioners were asserting a "public right" to have the law en-
forced. 13 While the writ of mandamus could technically have issued, the 
Court chose to delay any further action until the town could validate 
the amendment by properly re-adopting it. Nine months were given to 
permit this validating action. The Court finally noted that, if the writ 
should later issue, the equitable principles which tended to validate the 
amendment should be considered in any enforcement proceedings. 
This case would be simpler if the Court had simply stated an absolute 
rule--that failure to give adequate notice in this case either was sufficient 
to invalidate the amendment or was not. But the analysis actually fol-
lowed is a sophisticated one, well designed to assure justice among the 
many interests represented, even if it provides a rather uncertain guide 
for future cases. Clearly, however, the Court is unwilling to suggest that 
even this type of notice provision can be violated with impunity; and 
it remains imperative for developers to comply with the notice provisions 
and to withhold investments until assured of proper compliance. 
§22.3. Denial, of building permit: Proposed amendment as basis. In 
Ouellette v. Building Inspector of Quincyl the Supreme Judicial Court 
was asked to reverse the denial of a building permit based upon a pro-
posed amendment to the Quincy zoning ordinance. In September of 
1967 the petitioner had applied for a building permit to construct a 53-
12 See Lexington v. Bean, 272 Mass. 547, 550-51,172 N.E. 867,869 (1930); 
Burlington v. Dunn, 318 Mass. 216, 217-19, 61 N.E.2d 243, 244 (1945). 
13 The Court cited Brady v. Board of Appeals, 348 Mass. 515, 204 N.E.2d 
513 (1965). There the plaintiff sought to reverse the granting of a special permit 
on land adjacent to her property. The Court stated that although "[f]ailure to 
take an appeal within the prescribed period from the granting or denial of a permit 
is a bar to a direct review of the action in respect of the permit . . . [Such] loss 
by an aggrieved citizen of the right of direct attack on a permit does not entail 
the loss of the right of the same citizen to bring a mandamus petition for enforce-
ment of the law and to stop violations in the construction going forward under 
the permit. 
"We hold that • . . the aggrieved abutter, by failure • . . to appeal . • . did 
not lose the right, which until then she had had along with other citizens and 
which other citizens continued to enjoy, to invoke by mandamus the public right 
to have the law immediately enforced. Resorting to mandamus showed an intent 
to seek enforcement of that right rather than the reversal of a decision of the 
building inspector." 348 Mass. at 520-22, 204 N.E.2d at 517. 
§22.3. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1369, 285 N.E.2d 423. 
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unit apartment building. At that time the land was zoned for the pro-
posed use; however in June of 1968 the city council amended the zoning 
ordinance to prohibit apartment buildings in the district in which the 
petitioner's land was located. Consequently the respondent building in-
spector denied the petitioner's application. Then, in December of 1970 
the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed a Land Court decision that in-
validated the 1968 zoning amendment for failure to comply with statu-
tory procedures.2 The petitioner resubmitted his application for a build-
ing permit, but the building inspector again refused to grant the permit 
because the city council had ordered him not to consider the request 
until after the proper adoption of the previously invalidated zoning 
amendment. The petitioner then obtained a writ of mandamus in the 
superior court directing the building inspector to issue a permit. 
On appeal the Court first held that mandamus was the proper remedy, 
rejecting the respondent's argument that an adequate administrative 
remedy was available. G.L., c. 40A, §13 provides that "[a]n appeal to 
the board of appeals . . . may be taken by any person aggrieved by 
reason of his inability to obtain a permit from any administrative official 
under the provisions of this chapter." (Emphasis added). But the Court 
interpreted this section to allow an administrative appeal only when the 
denial of a permit is based upon "the provisions of this chapter." Since 
in the present case the inspector refused the permit "on account of 
improper interference with his duties by other municipal officials,"3 the 
Court reasoned that such an appeal would be futile, and thus not re-
quired.4 
Turning to the merits, the Court noted that the city council did not 
have the authority to direct the building inspector to refuse the permit. 
However, the respondent argued that the action of the building in-
spector should nevertheless be affirmed on the rationale of Doliner v. 
Planning Board of Millis.5 In that case the Court held that a planning 
board could properly reject a plan as inconsistent with a newly adopted 
zoning amendment, although it had not yet been approved by the At-
torney General.6 The Court rejected the analogy, distinguishing between 
the proposed zoning amendment in the case at bar and the adopted but 
not yet finally approved and published amendment in the Doliner case.' 
Furthermore G.L., c. 40A, §12, empowers a building inspector to with-
hold a permit only for violations of "any zoning ordinance or by-law or 
2 Trumper v. City of Quincy, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1455, 264 N.E.2d 689. 
3 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1369, 1373, 285 N.E.2d 423, 426. 
4 Id. at 1373-74, 285 N.E.2d at 426. For other discussions on the propriety of 
mandamus, see §§16.10 and 20.5, supra. 
5 343 Mass. 1, 175 N.E.2d 919 (1961). 
6 Attorney General approval of town by-laws is governed by G.L., c. 40, §32. 
For an analysis of this power, see §16.10, supra. 
7 The Court noted that a proposed amendment could be changed before 
adoption, while an adopted by-law is rarely disapproved by the Attorney General. 
1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1369, 1375-76, 285 N.E.2d 423, 428. 
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amendment thereof," and not for violations of a proposed amendment. 
Accordingly, the Court held that the building inspector could not refuse 
to issue a building permit because the building would violate proposed 
zoningamendments.8 
The Ouellette case graphically illustrates the confrontation that often 
occurs between a community and a developer. In the future a com-
munity will be unable to rely upon the mere prospect of a zoning change 
to block a proposed project. The rule of the Doliner case now emerges 
as a narrow exception, depending in large part upon the very limited 
review authority of the Attorney General. Thus if a permit is to be 
denied it will have to be refused under the authority of presently adopted 
law. 
§22.4. Zoning regulation coverage: Provisions for sewage facilities. 
Four years ago in Enos v. City of Brockton,1 the Supreme Judicial Court 
ruled that a zoning provision requiring all multiple dwellings to be of 
"second class construction" was not authorized under the Zoning En-
abling Act.2 The definition of "second class construction" was not stated 
in the zoning ordinance but rather in the city's building code. Since 
zoning laws and building codes are designed to serve divergent purposes, 
the Court concluded that they could not be combined. 
The Enos decision created considerable uncertainty as to the judicial 
limitations which might be imposed upon broadly drafted zoning by-
laws. After Enos, it seemed clear that a building code regulation could 
not be enforced under the guise of a zoning ordinance. It was unclear, 
however, whether the Court intended Enos to be interpreted as a narrow 
limitation confined to the interaction between zoning and building regula-
tion or as a signal that zoning ordinances embodying other types of 
regulations not clearly within the traditional ambit of zoning would also be 
struck down. 
The question of the scope of the Enos decision has been largely re-
solved by the Supreme Judicial Court decision in Decoulos v. City of 
Peabody.! Peabody had a zoning ordinance that permitted certain com-
mercial uses on the locus in question, "provided, however, that no such 
use ... be permitted unless the sewage disposal for said lot is connected 
to the municipal sanitary sewer system." The locus was not served by 
such a system and an extension would have been required before the 
system could service the lot. The owner sought declaratory relief, seeking 
to have the provision declared invalid but the lower court sustained the 
ordinance. 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, noting that the ordinance in-
creased rather than relaxed the standards imposed by state statutes and 
8 Yd. at 1374-76 285 N.E.2d at 427-29. 
§22.4. 1 354 Mass. 278, 236 N.E.2d 919 (1968), noted in 1968 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §l2.4. 
2 G.L., c. 40A. 
! 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1593, 274 N.E.2d 816. 
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the State Sanitary Code.4 Thus the case did not involve a conflict with 
overriding state policy, but solely the issue of whether the state sanitary 
or public health laws preclude "a city from including more specific and 
stringent health protection measures adopted pursuant to G.L., c. 40A."5 
The Court found the regulation to be well within the type of public 
health and welfare purposes of the Zoning Enabling Act. This decision 
clearly suggests that the Zoning Enabling Act will not be narrowly con-
strued, especially in light of the broad purposes enumerated in Sections 
2 and 3 of G.L., c. 4DA.6 
In discussing Enos v. City of Brockton, the Court stated: "We regard 
the Enos case as limited in application to provisions uniquely appropriate 
to building codes.'" Indeed, in a footnote to the opinion, the Court in-
timated that Enos was a very narrow decision which ought to be con-
fined to its facts.a The footnote dealt with the plaintiff's challenge of 
another zoning ordinance, one which required that all structures in a 
particular zone have an outer wall of generally consistent external ap-
pearances and of fireproof or fire-resistant materials. The Court stated: 
"We note merely that [the relevant regulation] ... did not as directly 
concern the details of all aspects of construction as did the provision 
considered in the Enos case, which incorporated by reference a provision 
of the building code." The Court did not rule on the validity of the 
regulation since that issue was not contested. Nevertheless the opinion 
at least hints that even some kinds of building provisions might be valid 
as long as they do not directly derive from or conflict with a building 
code regulation. 
§22.5. Flood plain zoning. Turnpike Realty Co. v. :Town of Ded-
ham! involved a major attack against a flood plain zoning provision of 
Dedham's zoning by-law. Petitioner had acquired land in Dedham, on 
the bank of the Charles River, in 1947. The land consisted primarily of 
low, swampy area, but included two knolls, one of 3.2 acres and the 
other of 0.2 acres. Petitioner intended to develop the land for residential 
use, and the land was originally zoned for that purpose. However in 
1963 the Town of Dedham amended its zoning by-law to include most 
of petitioner's land, including the knolls, in a Flood Plain District. This 
greatly reduced the potential uses of the land,2 and effectively precluded 
4 G.L., c. 111, §l27A; State Sanitary Code §§2.9-6.9 (1966 ed.). See also 
G.L., c. 83, §§3, II. 
5 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1594, 274 N.E.2d at 817. 
6 The Court noted the health and welfare aspect of Section 2 as it related 
to the use of buildings, structures and land, and the conservation of health, pro-
vision for sewerage, and preservation of amenities set out in Section 3. 
7 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1596, 274 N.E.2d at 818. 
a 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1593 n.1, 274 N.E.2d at 817 n.I. 
122.5. ! 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1303, 284 N.E.2d 891. 
2 The amendment provided that "'[wlithin a Flood Plain District no structure 
or building shall be erected, altered or used, and no premises shall be used 
except for one or more of the following uses: Any woodland, grassland, wetland, 
8
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its development for residential purposes.3 The petitioner attacked the 
validity of the zoning amendment in the Land Court,4 but the judge 
ruled that the amendment was valid and fully applicable to the peti-
tioner's land. On appeal the petitioner raised nine separate issues for 
resolution by the Supreme Judicial Court. Because of the novel problems 
created by flood plain zoning, and because the case presents the Court's 
first detailed discussion of such zoning, these issues will be discussed in 
detail. For simplicity, the issues to be discussed will be grouped under 
two headings: (a) the validity of the by-law, and (b) the applicability 
of the by-law to petitioner's land. 
Validity of the by-law. Petitioner first claimed that the enactment of 
Dedham'5 flood plain zoning provisions was beyond the authority granted 
in Chapter 40A, the Zoning Enabling Act. Section 2 of that Chapter pro-
vides that "[a] zoning by-law may provide that lands deemed subject 
to seasonal or periodic flooding shall not be used for residence or other 
purposes in such a manner as to endanger the health or safety of the 
occupants thereof."5 (Emphasis added). Since Dedham's Flood Plain 
District contained unoccupied land, he argued, the by-law was not 
within the powers granted by the quoted sentence of Section 2. However, 
the Court held that this sentence in no way limits the authority of a 
municipality to enact a flood plain zoning by-law. The municipality 
could have enacted the challenged by-law under the general grant of 
authority in G.L., c. 40A, §§2, 3, since the intent behind the by-law 
was in keeping with the promotion of the public health, safety and wel-
fare.6 The purpose of the by-law was specified in its preamble,? and the 
agricultural, horticultural, or recreational use of land or water not requiring filling. 
Buildings and ,sheds accessory to any of the Flood Plain uses are pennitted on 
approval of the Board of Appeals. • . . [A] ny such building or structure shall be 
designed, placed, and constructed to offer a minimum obstruction to the flow of 
water; and ... it shall be finnly anchored to prevent floating away.''' Id. at 
1304, 284 N.E.2d at 894. 
3 The by-law allowed variances from pennitted uses only in very restricted 
circumstances: "'If any land in the Flood Plain District is proven to the satis-
faction of the Board of Appeals after the question has been referred to the 
Planning Board, the Board of Health, and the Board of Selectmen, and reported 
on by all three Boards or the lapse of thirty days from the date of referral 
without a report, as being in fact not subject to flooding or not unsuitable because 
of drainage conditions for 'any use which would otherwise be permitted if such 
land were not, by operation of this section, in the Flood Plain district, and that 
the use of such land for any such use will not interfere with the general purposes 
for which Flood Plain district have been established, and will not be detrimental 
to the public health, safety, or Welfare, the Board of Appeals may, after a public 
hearing with due notice, issue a permit for any such use.''' (Emphasis added). Id. 
4 Suit was brought pursuant to G.L., c. 185, § 1 (j Yz) and G.L., c. 240, § 14A. 
5 This sentence was added to Section 2 by Acts of 1954, c. 368, §2. 
6 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1307-08, 284 N.E.2d at 896. The same reasoning 
was used to reject petitioner's contention that the by-law was an unconstitutional 
exercise of Dedham's police power: "The general necessity of flood plain zoning 
9
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Court found it to be consistent with the generally accepted objectives of 
flood plain zoning.8 Further, the fact that "aesthetic considerations" were 
included in the preamble was not fatal. Although such considerations 
may not alone be used to justify restrictions on the use of property,9 
they do not invalidate an otherwise valid restriction.10 
The petitioner also attacked several provisions of the by-law as unduly 
vague and ambiguous. Under the by-law special permits for other than 
"flood plain" uses may be granted if certain conditions are proven to 
exist "to the satisfaction of the Board of Appeals."l1 Petitioner argued 
that the by-law provided no standards to measure the Board's "satisfac-
tion," and that the exercise of the special permit power could thus be 
arbitrary and capricious. 
While the Court agreed that in delegating authority to a board, 
adequate standards must be set, it also noted that" '[t]he standards need 
not be of such a detailed nature that they eliminate entirely the element 
of discretion from the board's decision.' "12 In the present case, the Court 
found that the standards set forth in both the Zoning Enabling Act and 
the zoning by-law were adequate to guide· the board in its actions. "The 
board must find that the land is not subject to flooding or not unsuitable 
because of drainage conditions for a particular use; and that such use 
to reduce the damage to life and property caused by flooding is unquestionable." 
rd. at 1312, 284 N.E.2d at 899. 
7 "'The purpose of the Flood Plain District is to preserve and maintain the 
ground water table; to protect the public health and safety, persons 'and public 
health and safety, persons and property against the hazardos of flood water inun-
dation; for the protection of the community against the costs which may be 
incurred when unsuitable development occurs in swamps, marshes, along water 
courses, or in areas subject to floods; and to conserve natural conditions, wild 
life, and open spaces for the education, recreation and general welfare of the 
public.''' rd. at 1304, 284 N.E.2d at 894. 
8 Such objectives are: "( 1) the protection of individuals who might choose, 
despite the flood dangers, to develop or occupy land on a flood plain; (2) the 
protection of other landowners from damages resulting from the development of 
a flood plain and the consequent obstruction of the flood flow; (3) the protection 
of the entire community from individual choices of land use which require sub-
sequent public expenditures for public works and disaster relief." rd. at 1308, 
284 N.E.2d at 896, citing Dunham, Flood Control Via the Police Power, 107 
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1098, 1110-17 (1959). 
9 Barney and Garey Co. v. Milton, 324 Mass. 440, 87 N.E. 2d 9, 14 (1949). 
10 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1308-09, 284 N.E.2d at 896; The petitioner also 
argued that the by-law was invalid because the motives of the Dedham conserva-
tion commission, a prime supporter of the by-law, were purely aesthetic. Since 
the purposes of the by-law were listed in its preamble, the Court deemed the 
motives of its supporters to be irrelevant. rd. at 1306, 284 N.E.2d at 895. 
11 See note 3, supra, for the text of the special permit provision of the by-law. 
12 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1311, 284 N.E.2d at 898, quoting MacGibbon v. 
Bd. of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 638, 255 N.E.2d 347, 350 (1970). 
The MacGibbon case is noted in 1971 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §17.3. 
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will not interfere with the general purposes of the flood plain district, 
and will not be detrimental to the 'public health, safety, or welfare.' "13 
Petitioner's final attack against the by-law was that the special permit 
procedure was of no value, since any permit issued under it would not 
be in keeping with the general purpose to protect persons and property 
against the danger of flooding. The Court rejected this argument. The 
provision in no way frustrates the general purpose of the by-law, since it 
conditions the issuance of the permit on a showing that land granted a 
permit is not subject to flooding or drainage difficulties.14 Further, the 
Court questioned the relevance of the argument: "The possibility that 
a special permit granted to a landowner would be contested in court 
and annulled does not render the by-law invalid."15 
Applicability of the by-law to petitioner's land. The petitioner claimed 
that, even if the by-law itself was valid, it could not validly be applied 
to his land. Two arguments were based on the wording of G.L., c. 40A, 
§2.16 Petitioner first argued that the use of the word "flooding" referred 
only to flooding from natural causes. Since his land became flooded only 
when a flood control gate on the Charles River was "mismanaged," his 
land could not be included in the Flood Control District. The Court rejec-
ted this contention, commenting that the evidence "in no way" suggested 
that the flood control gate had been operated "unreasonably."17 Petitioner 
further claimed that Section 5 requires a locality to specifically find that 
all land included in a Flood Plain District is in fact subject to seasonal 
or periodic flooding. This allegedly followed from the contention "that 
flood plain zoning is a radical departure from ordinary zoning concepts, 
and that the Legislature intended that a narrower standard of validity 
be used."18 Here the Court merely referred to its earlier holding that 
Section 2 does not limit the power of municipalities to utilize zoning 
techniques to control flooding. 19 Since general standards for the validity 
of zoning enactments were thus to be applied, the town had acted prop-
erly in implicitly deeming petitioner's land to be subject to periodic 
flooding.20 
Relative to his argument that the by-law itself was an unconstitutional 
exercise of the police power,2' petitioner also argued that the inclusion 
13 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1311, 284 N.E.2d at 898. 
14 Id. at 1312, 284 N.E.2d at 898. 
15 Id. 
16 See text at note 5, supra. 
17 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1306, 284 N.E.2d at 895. The Court's use of a 
"reasonableness" test is puzzling. The implication is that flooding caused by an 
"unreasonable" artificial stimulus cannot be regulated by a zoning by-law. It is 
arguable that the implication was not intended, however, since artificial floods 
can be as deleterious to the public health, safety and welfare as a natural flood. 
See text at note 6, supra. 
18 Id. at 1317,284 N.E.2d at 901. 
19 See text at note 6, supra. 
20 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1317, 284 N.E.2d at 901. 
21 See note 6, supra. 
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of his land in the Flood Control District had no reasonable relationship 
to any valid municipal power. In rejecting this claim the Court reviewed 
the evidence relied upon by the land court in its decision that petitioner's 
land was subject to flooding. The evidence included the testimony of an 
expert hydrologist to the effect that the land could be expected to be 
covered by up to three feet of water annually. This evidence of potential 
flooding, coupled with the fact that under the by-law use of the land 
was not totally prohibited22 led to the conclusion that the restrictions 
placed on petitioner's land were not unreasonable.23 
Petitioner argued that, even if the by-law was validly applicable to 
his land, his two knolls should not be included in the flood plain district. 
The evidence as to whether they had in fact been included by the town 
was conflicting. The town engineer had been instructed to include in 
the flood district only swamp areas below 98 feet elevation, thus exclud-
ing the two knolls which were at elevations of 121 feet and 111 feet, but 
the flood plain map accepted by a vote of a Dedham town meeting in-
cluded the knolls in the Flood Plain District. The Court acknowledged 
that the inclusion of the knolls on the official map may have been 
inadvertent. However, it held the inclusion to be "sensible," since the 
petitioner would not be able to use these areas for residential purposes 
without first obtaining a special permit for access to the knolls over 
the surrounding land. Since a special permit would have to be obtained 
regardless of whether the knolls were included in the district, the Court 
upheld their inclusion.24 
Finally, the petitioner argued that the by-law reduced the value of 
his land to such an extent as to amount to a taking without just compen-
sation. Although there was conflicting evidence as to the exact reduction 
in value of the land, the trial judge acknowledged that the loss was sub-
stantial.25 However, the Court agreed with the lower court judge that 
"'the mere decrease in the value of a particular piece of land is not 
conclusive evidence of an unconstitutional deprivation of property.' "26 
Although the Court noted that the line between regulation and con-
fiscation is often difficult to draw, it concluded that the decrease in the 
value of petitioner's land did not amount to an unconstitutional depriva-
tion of property.27 
§22.6. Definition of tenns: "Lot" and "Fann." The use of the 
22 See note 2, supra. 
23 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1313-14, 284 N.E.2d at 899. 
24 Id. at 1316, 284 N.E.2d at 901. 
25 Petitioner's expert witness testified that the land was worth $431,000 as 
residential property, but that the restrictions reduced its value to $53,000. Re-
spondent's witness testified that no reduction in value resulted, since it was 
economically unfeasible to develop the lowlands for residential use. 
26 Id. 
'J:1 The Court cited, as an example of a great change in value that did not 
constitute an unconstitutional taking Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1951), 
which involved a diminution in value from $800,000 to $60,000. 
12
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1972 [1972], Art. 25
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1972/iss1/25
628 1972 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §22.6 
words "lot" and "farm" in zoning ordinances and by-laws is frequently 
important in detennining if a particular use will be pennitted. These 
words have posed considerable construction problems in the past. The 
interpretation of both words came before the Supreme Judicial Court 
during this SURVEY year. 
In Lindsay v. Board of Appeals of Milton,l plaintiffs had applied for 
a building pennit to construct a single family dwelling and garage on the 
locus but the permit was denied on the ground that the locus did not 
constitute a buildable lot. The locus had originally been a separate lot 
under a 1903 plan. This lot and another came into single ownership in 
1920. Prior to 1945 the two lots had been transferred as separate lots, 
though under a single deed. In 1945 and again in 1967 both lots were 
deeded as a single parcel with a single description by metes and bounds. 
Zoning was adopted by Milton in 1938. The by-law definition of "lot" 
was as follows: "A 'lot' is a single area of land in one ownership . . . 
[laid out] by metes, bounds or boundary lines in a recorded deed or on a 
recorded plan .... "2 Another by-Iaw3 provided that dwellings could be 
erected on any lot established prior to 1938, but not on lots established 
thereafter, unless those lots contained 40,000 square feet with 150 feet 
of frontage. The locus fell short of the area and frontage requirements, 
but the plaintiffs claimed that the lot had been established prior to 1938 
and was therefore exempted from those requirements. 
The Court held that the by-law definition of "lot" referred to the 
description of the property in the most recently recorded deed or plan. 
Both the 1945 and 1967 deeds defined the locus as part of a larger 
single area, even though· originally the locus was described as a separate 
lot. Thus, the attempt in the present case to change what was a single 
lot under the 1945 and 1967 deeds into the original two lots under the 
1903 plan (and several other intennediate conveyances) was invalid. 
The meaning of "fann" has also been frequently litigated because of 
the many agricultural and farming districts in towns with considerable 
land that is largely undeveloped, or at least not yet urbanized.4o The 
question in Moore v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Middleborough5 was 
whether a mink ranch was a "fann" under the local zoning by-law. 
Plaintiffs in Moore had been ordered to cease the raising of minks in a 
residential area because such activity did not confonn to farming activities 
pennitted by the by-laws. The Court had faced a similar problem in 
§22.6. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1199, 284 N.E.2d 595. 
2 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1201, 284 N.E.2d at 597. 
:I Id. 
4 See, e.g., Hume v. Building Inspector, 355 Mass. 179,243 N.E.2d 189 (1969); 
Pendoley v. Ferreira, 345 Mass. 309, 187 N.E.2d 142 (1963); Mioduszewski v. 
Saugus, 337 Mass. 140, 148 N.E.2d 655 (1958); Lincoln v. Murphy, 314 Mass. 
16, 49 N .E.2d 453 (1943). The Court also noted the similarity between this 
type of case and the dairy fann case of Cumberland Farms of Conn. Inc. v. 
Zoning Board of Appeal, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 357, 267 N.E.2d 906. 
5 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1811, 276 N.E.2d 712. 
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Commonwealth v. Procto,s where it held that "mink" were not "domestic 
or other animals" and that the land was not being used for "agricultural 
purposes." In Moore, the Court found no reason not to follow the earlier 
case and thus sustained the order for the Moores to cease their mink 
ranching. The defendant also argued that G.L., c. 128, §8B, defines 
"mink" as domestic animals, but the Court concluded that that provision 
applied only to the Agricultural matters specifically enumerated therein. 
The statutory language in no way affected the definition of "farm" in a 
zoning by-law, which has a totally different and unrelated purpose. 
§22.7. Appeal by city counsel from board of appeal decision. G.L., 
c.40A, §21, authorizes appeals from decisions of a local board of appeals 
by planning boards and municipal officers, as potentially aggrieved par-
ties. Chapter 334 of the Acts of 1972 added "city council" to this group 
of officials and bodies who have a right of appeal. Although municipal 
officials and planning boards can adequately represent the public interest 
under most circumstances, there may be occasions when a city council, 
as the legislative body whose regulations are being interpreted by the 
board, should be the appellant.. While the enforcing and planning agen-
cies will presumptively remain the appropriate parties to appeal, this 
amendment at least provides the opportunity for broader representation 
of public interests that may be opposed to the variance or special permit 
that has been granted. 
§22.8. Zoning appeals: Jurisdictional requirements. In the 1967 
case of McLaughlin v. Rockland Zoning Board of Appeals,l the Supreme 
Judicial Court was asked to determine the effect Section 21 of the 
Zoning Enabling Act2 which provides that when an appeal to the su-
perior court is taken from a decision of the zoning board of appeals, 
"[w]ritten notice of such appeal together with a copy of the bill in equity 
shall be given to [the] city or town clerk within ... twenty day[s]" after 
the board has filed its decision. While the petitioner in McLaughlin had 
filed a copy of the bill with the clerk within the prescribed period, he 
failed to file the written notice required by section 21. The Court, never-
theless, did not consider the defective filing to be fatal to jurisdiction 
and allowed the appeal to be perfected. During the 1972 SURVEY year 
the Court was faced with a similar issue under a factual situation con-
verse to that in McLaughlin. 
In Carr v. Board of Appeals of Saugus3 the petitioner filed his notice 
of appeal with the town clerk within the proper period of appeal4 but 
did not file a copy of the bill in equity, the original of which had been 
timely filed in the superior court, until some ten days after the prescribed 
6 355 Mass. 504, 246 N.E.2d 454 (1969). 
§22.8. 1 351 Mass. 678, 223 N.E.2d 521 (1967). 
2 G.L., c. 40A, §21. 
3 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 513, 280 N.E.2d 199. 
4 The lO-day period actually ended on a Sunday but the Court held that the 
notice was proper when filed on Monday. 
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period had elapsed. The superior court dismissed the bill holding that 
the failure to file a copy of the bill in a timely fashion was fatal to its 
jurisdiction over the matter. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed and 
remanded the case for determination on its merits. 
Relying on McLaughlin as its basic authority, the Court reiterated 
that it was reluctant to attribute to the General Court an intent" 'to 
create a series of procedural barriers reminiscent of an earlier age of 
the law.'''5 It noted that the purpose of the statutory requirement at 
issue "is to give interested third persons at least constructive notice of 
the appeal,"6 and that therefore the filing of either the bill in equity or 
the notice of appeal would satisfy that purpose. The Court further 
pointed out that the circumstances in Carr presented an even stronger 
argument for adequate notice than had been presented in McLaughlin 
where a filing of a copy of the bill "constituted an implied representation 
that the original had been filed in the Superior Court."7 The Court 
reasoned that the written notice filed in the Carr situation was "an ex-
press assertion that a bill in equity has been filed."8 
It is difficult to object to a decision such as Carr, which prevents an 
apparently superfluous act from barring an appeal which may otherwise 
be valid. If we accept the Court's view that the purpose of the statutory 
provision in question is to give third parties notice of the appeal, then 
the filing of either the notice of appeal or the bill in equity should, as 
the Court concluded, meet this need. If, however, the purpose is also 
to give third persons some idea of the nature of the appeal, the filing of 
the bill in equity, as in the McLaughlin case, would more clearly meet 
the requirement. But the Court, with its emphasis on the fact of notice 
alone, comments that the filing of the notice in Carr would be a more 
certain fact than the filing of the bill in equity in McLaughlin. 
Despite the liberal view taken in these cases, an attorney would be 
well advised to follow the strict requirements of the statute and not 
depend on these cases as setting a lesser standard. A faulty notice, un-
accompanied by a bill, might well be inadequate even under the flexible 
view of the Court in these cases. 
§22.9. Accessory uses. Zoning ordinances generally provide that 
land which is zoned for certain specified uses may also be used for 
"accessory uses" which, although not expressly permitted, are subordi-
nate and closely related to the permitted uses. The accessory use is 
usually required to "be clearly subordinate to, and customarily incidental 
to, and located on the same premises with the main use or structure 
to which it is accessory."1 The classic example is, of course, an auto-
5 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 513, 514, 280 N.E.2d 199, 200, quoting McLaughlin v. 
Rockland Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 351 Mass. 678, 682, 223 N.E.2d 521, 524 
(1967). 
6 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 513, 514, 280 N.E.2d 199, 200. 
7 Id. 
SId. 
§22.9. 1 Town of Harvard v. Maxant, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1601, 1604, 275 
N.E.2d 347, 349. 
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mobile garage in a residential zone. However, it is important to note 
that the accessory use must be exactly that-accessory-and that it 
will not be permitted unless the land upon which the subordinate use 
takes place is attendant to or co-extensive with the land used for the 
primary permitted use. 
In Town of Harvard v. Maxant,2 decided during the 1972 SURVEY 
year, the Supreme Judicial Court indicated one use that will not be 
considered as "accessory" for purposes of the accessory use doctrine. The 
town sought and obtained an injunction to prevent defendant from using 
land he owned, but upon which he did not reside, as a private airport. 
Defendant appealed from a final decree entered in favor of the town 
arguing that his use of the property was a private recreational use of 
residential property not inconsistent with the regulatory scheme of the 
town's zoning by-law. The Court encountered no difficulty in dispensing 
with defendant's appeal. Perhaps more importantly, the M axant opinion 
may provide some inkling of how the Court will view future appeals in 
accessory use cases. 
The major point in defendant's appeal concerned zoning by-law pro-
visions which proscribed and permitted certain types of activities as 
accessory uses. Defendant argued that, since a private landing strip is 
not a use encompassed within those prohibited by the by-law, such a 
unique use would, consequently, be a permitted accessory use. The Court 
rejected this thesis as "oversimplified," noting that "[t]here is no require-
ment that zoning by-laws or ordinances follow any particular pattern or 
structure. They may take the form of prescribing uses permitted, pro-
scribing uses prohibited, or a combination of the two."3 
The Court's treatment of what will, or will not, constitute an "acces-
sory" relationship also merits comment. In Maxant, the defendant neither 
resided nor conducted any activity on the premises other than using it 
as an airport. In the absence of some dominant permitted use it cannot 
be said that a particular use is "accessory." To ',be an accessory use "the 
use must not be the primary use of the property but rather one which is 
subordinate [to the primary use] and minor in significance [thereto]."4 
A third aspect of the M axant case concerns the question of what will 
be considered a "customary" accessory use, given the existence of a 
primary-subordinate use relationship. Although the Court noted that its 
decision in Maxant is limited to the peculiar factual situation presented 
therein and will not necessarily portend the Court's treatment of a 
similar case at a future time when private landing strips are more pre-
2 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1601, 275 N.E.2d 347. 
3 Id.at 1604, 275 N.E.2d at 350. 
4 Id. at 1606, 275 N.E.2d at 351. 
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valent,5 it should be noted that the Maxant ruling indicates a rather 
skeptical view of what will constitute a "customarily incidental" accessory 
use. 
The present case is a to-be-anticipated application of the doctrine of 
accessory uses. The lengthy and detailed discussion of the attributes nec-
essary for a use to :be defined as accessory is, however, of substantial 
importance in clarifying this area of the law. 
§22.1O. Nonconforming uses: Expansion of use: Billboard regulation. 
Under G.L., c. 40A, §5, no zoning by-law or ordinance may prohibit 
any buildings and uses in existence at the time of adoption, even if 
such buildings and uses are inconsistent with the adopted zoning scheme. 
However, the statute also provides that subsequent changes in noncon-
forming uses may be subject to zoning regulations. In two cases decided 
during the 1972 SURVEY yearl the Supreme Judicial Court was asked to 
rule on the scope of the protection given to nonconforming uses by G.L., 
c.40A, §5. 
McAleer v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable2 arose when the East Bay 
Lodge received a use-change perniit from the Barnstable Board of Ap-
peals. The lodge, a hotel-restaurant complex, had been built in 1900, 
and became a "non-conforming use" in 1956 when Barnstable adopted 
a zoning by-law. At that time it was operated only during the summer 
months; however, after receiving a year-round liquor license in 1965, 
it was operated on a year-round basis. The use-change permit allowed the 
operator to make physical alterations on the main lodge building and a 
separate cottage used for rental purposes, and to convert two employee 
dormitories into rental facilities. The permit was granted pursuant to 
zoning by-law provisions that were sympathetic to the expansion and 
continuation of nonconforming uses.3 
Plaintiffs, owners of abutting real estate, brought two actions to con-
test the lodge's expansion. In the first action, brought by a bill in equity,4 
plaintiffs sought an annulment of the board's permit and a judicial 
ruling that the proposed use changes were inconsistent with the local 
5 The Court distinguished two cases from other jurisdictions, Schantz v. Rach-
lin, 101 N.J. Super. 334, aff'd, 104 N.]. Super. 154 (1969) (cited by defendant 
Maxant) and Samsa v. Heck, 13 Ohio App.2d 94, 235 N.E.2d 312 (1967) (cited 
by the plaintiff town), in which "the question whether a private landing strip 
is accessory to a residential use" was litigated. See 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1608, 
275 N.E.2d at 352. 
§22.10. 1 McAleer v. Bd. of Appeals of Barnstable, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 469, 
280 N.E.2d 1966; John Donnelly and Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Board, 
1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1057, 282 N.S.2d 661. 
2 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 469, 280 N.E.2d 166. 
3 The board ruled that the proposed alterations to the four buildings and the 
net result stemming therefrom would not "exceed, extend or change the prior 
existing use ... and that such alterations would not be more detrimental to the 
neighborhood." Record at 14. 
4 G.L., c. 40A, §21 provides that review of action taken by municipal boards of 
appeal may be had by a bill in equity. 
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zoning by-law. In the second action, brought by a petition for mandamus, 
plaintiffs also sought court orders prohibiting the lodge from operating 
the premises other than during the summer months.5 The two actions 
were consolidated for trial in the superior court. The court annulled the 
board's permit insofar as it related to the two dormitories because. "the 
nature and purpose of the use prevailing"6 prior to 1956 was vastly 
different from the rental housing now proposed by the lodge. The trial 
justice affirmed the Board's permit as it related to structural modifications 
of the lodge and the cottage since the planned alterations did not sub-
stantially change the nonconforming use. On the mandamus action, the 
trial justice ruled that "the change from 'seasonal to year-round opera-
tion' constituted an unlawful expansion of the nonconforming use, and 
that the operation of the Lodge must be restricted to the four summer 
months."7 
On appeal the Supreme Judicial Court sustained the superior court 
rulings on the bill in equity.8 The key issue on review concerned the 
standard invoked by the Board in issuing the disputed permit. Under 
the Barnstable zoning by-law nonconforming uses may be changed only 
where the intended use is not mo.re detrimental to. the neighbo.rho.o.d, 
while special permits may be issued only where, inter alia, it is clear that 
the effect of the intended activity will be witho.ut substantial detriment 
to. the public go.o.d. The Board predicated its decision to permit extension 
of the Lodge's nonconforming use upon a finding that "the alterations 
sought by the Lodge 'would not be more detrimental to the neighbor-
hood,' "9 thus applying the nonconforming use standard. Plaintiffs argued 
that since the proposed changes would require a special permit, the non-
conforming use standard was inappropriate and, accordingly, the Board's 
findings should be vitiated. The Court rejected this contention, stating 
that decisions to issue special permits for nonconforming uses may be 
predicated upon nonconforming use criteria instead of special permit 
5 In the mandamus action, plaintifFs sought to compel the town building in-
spector to act to limit the Lodge's inn business to the summer season, and to 
enjoin the Lodge from conducting its business in other than the summer months. 
Record at 15-17. 
6 Record at 30. 
7 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 471, 280 N.E.2d at 168. In the mandamus action, 
plaintiffs also argued that the Lodge should be allowed to conduct its bar and 
restaurant business only for its lodgers. The trial judge rejected this contention, 
and the plaintiffs did not successfully perfect their appeal of this ruling. 
8 The Court affirmed the trial court determination that the conversion of the 
dormitories from employee housing into rental lodging was a change "not only 
in the use but also in the nature of the facilities," which under the town zoning 
by-law would be an unlawful extension of the nonconforming use. The Court also 
upheld the trial court approval of the board's issuance of a permit for the other 
two structures, finding that the alterations proposed therefor comported with 
the scope of change permitted under the by-law. 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 473-4, 
280 N.E.2d at 169. 
9 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 472, 280 N.E.2d at 168. 
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standards. Moreover, "[t]he distinction between the two phrases, 'not 
more detrimental to a neighborhood,' and 'without substantial detriment 
to the public good,' at least in this case, is one of words and not of 
substances."lo Noting that the Board applied the stricter of the two 
standards, the Court held that the proper standard was applied. 
Turning to the mandamus appeal, the Court reversed the trial court's 
issuance of the writ. The major issue was whether the expansion from a 
seasonal to a year-round use was a mere increase in business intensity, 
or an unlawful expansion of a nonconforming use. Although the town 
by-law provided "little explicit guidance" on this point, the Court con-
strued it as expressing "a spirit sympathetic to nonconforming uses and 
their expansion,"11 and thus as differing from many other ordinances 
and by-laws which expressly prohibit, or drastically inhibit, expansion 
of nonconforming uses. 12 In upholding the expansion the Court relied 
upon a Maine case which held that an ordinance with a similarly liberal 
approach to expansion of nonconforming uses permitted an inn to shift 
from a seasonal to a year-round operation.13 The Court distinguished 
McAleer from other cases where it was proven that the expansion to a 
year-round operation would result in a "deleterious effect,"14 or where 
year-round operation was one of a series of elements which would make 
the expansion grossly incompatible with the zoning scheme.15 
Another issue raised in the mandamus appeal was the extent to which 
a defendant can rely upon laches to forestall the enforcement of a 
municipal zoning enactment. The lodge owner argued that, although 
the doctrine of estoppel can never preclude a municipality from enforc-
ing its zoning laws,16 the failure of any private citizens to contest the 
issuance of the year-round liquor license in 1965 precluded the present 
suit. The lodge owner relied upon Chilson v. Zoning Board of Appeal 
of Attleboro.17 in which the Supreme Judicial Court used the doctrine 
of laches to reject a private challenge to a building inspector's illegal 
approval of a nonconforming use. Although the lodge owner had made 
a heavy investment in remodeling the lodge after receiving the liquor 
license, the Court rejected his defense: "We feel here that the policy 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 474, 280 N.E.2d at 170. 
12 The Court cited Inspector of Bldgs. v. Murphy, 320 Mass. 207, 68 N.E.2d 
918 (1946) as representative of a by-law unsympathetic toward expansion of 
nonconfonning uses. 
13 Frost v. Lucey, 231 A.2d 441 (Me. 1967). 
14 Hantman v. Randolph, 58 N.J. Super. 127, 155 A.2d 554 (1959). 
15 The Court thus distinguished Everpure Ice Mfg. Co. v. Board of Appeals, 
324 Mass. 433, 86 N.E.2d 906 (1949), in which the change in times of the 
operation also involved change in the nature of the business. 
16 Ferrante v. Board of Appeals of Northampton, 345 Mass. 158, 162, 186 
N.E.2d 471, 474-75 (1962), and cases cited. 
17 344 Mass. 406, 182 N.E.2d 535 (1962). 
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favoring enforcement of the zoning by-law outweighs the possibility that 
a Chilson-type ruling might be made applicable here because of laches."18 
Apart from demonstrating the maze of procedural ploys that may ob-
fuscate a zoning issue,19 McAleer indicates how the Court views issues 
involving the expansion of a nonconforming use. The Court is apparently 
inclined to allow municipalities to adopt a wide spectrum of zoning 
regulations governing the expansion of nonconforming uses, whether 
sympathetic or adverse thereto. McAleer also indicates that the Court 
will not, as a matter of course, invoke the doctrine of estoppel to bar 
private challenges, however belated, to municipal permits issued in viola-
tion of nonconforming use regulations. 
The application of the nonconforming use exception to billboard regu-
lation was the subject of litigation in John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. 
Outdoor Advertising Board.2o G.L., c. 93, §29 vests in the Outdoor Ad-
vertising Board the authority to issue permits regulating the operation of 
billboards throughout the Commonwealth. Prior to 1969 the board's 
regulations had "protected billboards in business and industrial areas to 
a considerable extent ... , although they [had] imposed restrictions upon 
billboards in other areas."21 In 1969, however the board amended its 
regulations to accord controlling weight to local by-laws in its annual 
review of billboard permits.22 This regulation prompted the Town of 
Avon to amend its zoning by-law to prohibit billboards within five hun-
dred feet of various public and quasi-public buildings and facilities.23 
When the plaintiff applied for renewal of its billboard permit, the board 
rejected it. Finding that plaintiff's billboard was within five hundred 
feet of a structure enumerated in the town by-law, the board voted not 
to renew the permit because of this contravention of the local zoning 
enactment. 
Plaintiff sought judicial review of the board's decision, and appealed 
the superior court's affirmance of that decision. Both the board's amended 
18 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 474, 280 N.E.2d at 169. 
19 Indeed, in analyzing the trial court's handling of the board's decision to 
issue the special expansion permits, Justice Reardon appears to have overlooked 
a consideration of the facts underlying the board's decision to permit remodelling 
of the fourth structure, the cottage, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 473-4, 280 N.E.2d at 
169. 
20 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1057, 282 N.E.2d 661. 
21 Id. at 1059, 282 N.E.2d 663. 
22 The 1969 amendment to the board's regulations reads in pertinent part: 
"No license or permit shall be granted for the location or maintenance of bill-
boards . . . within a . . . town except where such location OT maintenance is in 
conformity with applicable ... by-laws enacted in accordance with ... [C.L., c. 
93, §29] and no ... by-law shall be deemed inconsistent with the ... [board's] 
rules and regulations . . . on the ground that such . . . by-law prohibits the 
location or maintenance of a billboard ... which in the absence of ... [the] 
by-law would be in conformity with . . . [board's] rules and regulations." (Em-
phasissupplied by the Court). Id. at 1059-60, 282 N.E.2d at 664. 
23 Id. at 1957 n. 1, 282 N.E.2d at 662 n. 1. 
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regulation and the town's amended zoning by-law were attacked as 
invalid.24 For present purposes, plaintiff's major argument was that G.L., 
c. 40A, §5 precluded the board from declining to renew the billboard 
permit. The billboard in question had been erected some forty years prior 
to the enactment of the billboard by-law. Since the billboard thus be-
came a nonconforming use, plaintiff argued that the protection accorded 
such uses by G.L., c. 4OA, §5 would preclude the board's refusal to 
permit continued use of the billboard. The Court rejected this purported 
application of Section 5. Plaintiff had "obviously accepted the original 
and each subsequent permit for this billboard with knowledge that the 
permit was for a term of one year and was revocable by the board for 
cause."25 Further, absent a permit the billboard would be categorized as 
a "nuisance,"2!i and would thus be subject to removal. The Court held 
that the owner of a billboard cannot avail himself of the protection 
provided nonconforming uses under G.L., c. 40A, §5: 
Where a billboard permit thus is essentially temporary, and where, 
in the absence of a required permit renewal, the billboard would 
constitute a public nuisance, we hold that it has not gained the 
status of a vested right constituting a protected nonconforming use 
under G.L., c. 40A, §5, as amended.27 
Further, the Court added that while Massachusetts "has no established 
principle of amortization of billboards for which permits are not re-
newed," plaintiff had little basis upon which to claim a protectible 
property interest since the controverted billboard had been in existence 
for a period of time longer than those which have been held to be 
proper periods of amortization.28 
The Donnelly case reflects the very low protection now given to bill-
boards. The annual nature of the permit does not properly establish 
24 Plaintiff argued that the board's regulation giving deferrence to local by-
laws regulating billboards was an improper delegation of the board's power to 
regulate outdoor advertising. Brief for Petitioner at 5. Concomitantly, plaintiff 
argued that Avon's billboard by-law was inconsistent with Chapter 93, inasmuch 
as that statute gives the board the authority to regulate billboards. Brief for 
Petitioner at 22-28. The Court rejected both arguments, holding that the board's 
regulatory powers were broad enough to permit some reliance on local regula-
tions. 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1062-63, 282 N.E.2d at 665-666. The Court was 
aided by G.L., c. 93, §29, which, after granting regulatory power to the board, 
provides that "[clities and towns may further regulate and restrict ... bill-
boards ... within their respective limits by ordinance or by-law, not inconsistent 
with . . . said rules and regulations. 
The Court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that Avon's bmboard by-law 
was an arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable exercise of the police power: "[T]he 
by-law is well within the general power to zone or to regulate for the public 
welfare." 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1065, 282 N.E.2d at 667. 
25 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1065, 282 N.E.2d at 667. 
26 G.L., c. 93, §§30A and 31. 
27 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1066, 282 N.E.2d at 668. 
28 Id. at 1066-7, 282 N.E.2d at 668. 
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any rights to a continuation of a permit, even if the practice has been 
to grant one readily. At a time when aesthetics and ecology are treated 
as valid public values, billboards cannot be expected to receive any ex-
tensive protection as a nonconforming use. The decision opens the way 
to extensive local regulation of billboards. Furthermore, it would seem 
that the Court's dictum similarly opens the way to extensive amortization 
of billboards pursuant to carefully drawn regulations. 
§22.11. Special permits. G.L., c. 40A, §4 confers upon cities and 
towns the statutory authority to grant special permits. It states that, 
subject to various procedural requirements, each zoning enactment may 
include provisions which allow for exceptions to the regulations and 
restrictions contained in the enactment and which provide for the 
issuance to individual applicants of special permits in accordance with 
the exceptions. Exceptions must "be in harmony with the general pur-
pose and intent" of the zoning enactment, and special permits may be 
granted "subject to appropriate conditions and safeguards."1 During the 
1972 SURVEY year, the Supreme Judicial Court decided three cases, Shu-
man u. Board of Aldermen of Newton,2 Josephs u. Board of Appeals of 
Brookline,3 and Humble Oil & Refining Company u. Board of Appeals of 
Amherst,4 in which the validity of actions taken pursuant to the special 
permit provisions of local zoning enactments and the statutory enabling 
provision of G.L., c. 40A, §4 were at issue. 
Shuman u. Board of Aldermen of Newton5 was, perhaps due to the 
unique factual situation presented, one of the Court's most innovative 
decisions in the special permits area. In Shuman, a private foundation 
sought to use a home located within a single-family residential district 
as a "half-way house" for high-school age runaways.6 The Newton zoning 
ordinance provided that the Board of Aldermen may grant a ~pecial 
permit for certain categories of uses in single-family residential districts.1 
The foundation's petition was referred to the Land Use Committee which 
considered the proposal and, after public hearing, recommended that 
the board grant the special permit subject to certain conditions. At a 
public meeting, the full board was given an oral report of the committee's 
recommendations. The board thereupon voted to adopt an order which 
§22.11. 1 G.L., c. 40A, §4. 
2 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 963, 282 N.E.2d 653. 
3 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1405, 285 N.E.2d 436. 
4 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1781, 276 N.E.2d 718. 
5 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 963, 282 N.E.2d 653. 
6 The petition was to operate a" 'dwelling for persons of high school age ... 
who are alienated from living with their parents.''' 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 964, 
282 N.E.2d at 655. 
7 Some of the additional uses for which the ordinance permitted special per-
mits include: "( 1) Association of persons living together in a common dwelling. 
(2) Hospital, sanitarium ... or other like institution. (3) Nursery school, trade 
... or vocational school, dormitory ... or other literary or educational institu-
tions." 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 964 n.2, 282 N.E.2d at 656 n.2 (emphasis sup-
plied by the Court). 
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granted the pennit. The order was fonnally filed with the city clerk. 
Subsequently, another document was filed with the clerk in which the 
rationale of the board's action was set forth. Prior to this second filing, 
the reasons for the board's decision were not on file with the clerk. 
Plaintiffs, residents in the vicinity of the building which the founda-
tion proposed to operate as a "half-way house," appealed the board's 
decision. They challenged the special pennit order on the grounds that 
the procedure by which it was granted was replete with irregularities. 
The superior court sustained the board's decision, finding that, if the 
conditions imposed by the order were adhered to, the proposed use 
would not have a deleterious effect upon the neighborhood; indeed, the 
court suggested that the proposed use would probably enhance the 
neighborhood in question. The court also found that the special permit 
was properly granted pursuant to a valid municipal zoning procedure. 
On appeal the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court's ruling. 
The Court dealt with a number of issues in plaintiffs' appeal. Plain-
tiffs first argued that the detailed findings required in variance pennits 
by G.L., c. 4OA, §18 were also required in special permit grants, and 
that the pennit was invalid because it was granted by way of a city order 
which did not contain such findings. ,Although the board's decision was 
"cast in the form of an order," the Court found that any technical 
deficiencies contained therein were "insubstantial" and immaterial. None-
theless, the Court did warn that "[t]his board, and other boards acting 
in like situations, should prepare decisions with more specific and com-
plete findings and statements of reasons."8 In addition, the procedural 
deficiencies of this case were cured by three other factors, namely, (1) 
the detailed conditions of use that were stated in the order, (2) the 
"supplemental statement" which was filed with the city clerk "within a 
reasonable time" of the board's original order, and (3) the written text 
of the committee's recommendations. T.he cumulative effect of these 
documents was sufficient to provide satisfactory evidence of the board's 
basis of decision. The Court went on to indicate that "[w]ith respect to 
a pennit for an exception, the specific requirements of a variance [G.L., 
c. 40A, §18] need not be satisfied."9 
Plaintiffs next argued that the use as. a "half-way house" did not 
conform to any of the categories of use exceptions enumerated in the 
Newton by-law,10 and therefore the committee's recommendation and 
the board's order granting the pennit were predicated upon the applica-
tion of an unconstitutionally vague standard. The Court responded that 
the proposed use could qualify under at least one, if not all three, of the 
use exceptions authorized by the zoning ordinance. 
The Shuman Court also sustained the validity of a pennit as granted 
to a specific pennit holder only for that holder's own use. In the 1958 
8 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 968, 282 N.E.2d at 658-59. 
9 Id. at 969, 282 N.E.2d at 659. 
10 See notes 6 and 7, supra. 
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decision of Todd v. Board of Appeals of Yarmouth,H the Court had 
intimated that the language of the special' permit section of the Zoning 
Enabling Act, G.L., c. 40A, §4, does not preclude, but in fact admits of, 
the granting of permits personal to the grantee: "The power to give 
permits for exceptions is so worded as to suggest that personal use may 
be contemplated .... "12 An opposing argument can, of course, be made 
that zoning statutes are designed to regulate land, not to determine per-
mitted land use on the basis of who, at a particular point in time, 
happens to be in possession or control thereof. The special permit, how-
ever, is a unique land use device designed to provide municipal zoning 
authorities with sufficient flexibility to permit select variations from zoning 
schemes. Because the success of these variations often depends upon a 
determination that the permit seeker is not irresponsible, the granting 
of a special permit which is limited, in appropriate cases, to one person 
or a group ought to be allowed. On the other hand, "personal" permits 
are privileges which should not be lightly granted lest they give anyone 
person special advantages over his neighbors. It is submitted that, except 
in situations similar to Shuman where the particular use of the land 
involves a strong public policy, the use of "personal" special permits 
should be discouraged since sufficient safeguards can be achieved by the 
insertion of carefully drafted conditions in special permit grants. 
In a second case involving procedures for the granting of special 
permits, Josephs v. Board of Appeals of Brookline,13 the Supreme Judicial 
Court annulled the granting of a special permit where there was in-
sufficient evidence of compliance with statutory and by-law prerequisites., 
Despite an incomplete factual presentation by the developer, the Brook-
line Board of Appeals granted special permits for the construction of 
an oddly-shaped building. On appeal, a superior court judge sustained 
these grants, relying exclusively upon the incomplete data presented to 
the board. Despite provisions of the Brookline zoning by-law which ex-
plicitly required the application of mathematical formulae in determina-
tions concerning special permit grants, neither the trial judge nor the 
board required strict adherence to the by-law provisions. Because of this 
patent disregard of the express provisions of the Brookline zoning enact-
ment, the Court invalidated the special permit. 
Josephs is indicative of the Court's intention to require municipal 
zoning authorities to comply with the zoning strictures they purport to 
enforce. Moreover, this decision underscores the hazards faced by de-
velopers who attempt to proceed with insufficient factual data. After 
Josephs, even if a local zoning board is sympathetic to a particular pro-
posal, the board may well be reluctant to grant a permit where there is 
an incomplete factual record. 
11 337 Mass. 162, 148 N.E.2d 380 (1958). 
12 Id. at 169, 148 N.E.2d at 384-85. 
13 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1405, 285 N.E.2d 436. Josephs also dealt with a 
variance issue. See 122.13., at text accompanying note 5-7, infra. 
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In a third case involving special pennits, Humble Oil & Refining 
Company v. Board of Appeals of Amherst,14 the Court reiterated a doc-
trine now clearly if only recently established in the Commonwealth, 
namely, that G.L., c. 40A, §4 does not create an absolute right to a 
special pennit, even if there is total compliance with the conditions 
specified in the zoning enactment.15 Plaintiff sought permission to con-
struct and operate an automobile service station in a limited business 
district. The Amherst zoning by-law states that special exceptions to 
zoning district limitations "may" be authorized upon a finding by the 
Board of Appeals that certain criteria are met. The board rejected 
plaintiff's application upon finding that further development of that busi-
ness district, when coupled with the steadily increasing traffic flow 
through the area, would create a hazardous traffic situation. Plaintiff 
appealed the board's decision, claiming that compliance with the by-
law conditions entitled him to a special permit as a matter of right. 
The superior court rejected plaintiff's claim, and the Supreme Judicial 
Court affinned, holding that the pertinent by-law had a permissive, and 
not mandatory meaning and that G.L., c. 40A, §4 does not crea:te a right 
to a special pennit since a board of appeals retains discretionary power. 
A board's discretionary exercise of authority may be successfully chal-
lenged only in instances where the decision has been based upon a 
" 'legally untenable ground, or is unreasonable, whimsical, capricious or 
arbitrary.' "16 
§22.12. Variances. During the 1972 SURVEY year the Supreme Judi-
cial Court decided four cases in which variance issues were involved. Al-
though none of these cases heralded any major change or development 
in the law, they are useful for further defining existing variance law. 
In Josephs v. Board of Appeal of Brookline1 a superior court decree 
sustaining a variance grant was appealed. 2 The variance granted was 
for a reduction in height of a loading bay in a building to be used for 
medical offices and for elderly housing. Since the topography of the locus 
made strict adherence to the Brookline zoning by-law loading bay re-
quirements either too dangerous, if too steep a driveway slope were 
used, or too costly, if it were decided to sacrifice floor area to meet the 
by-law requirements, the town Board of Appeals granted the variance. 
On appeal de novo, a superior court judge found that literal adherence 
to the by-law requirement would create a "hardship, financial or other-
14 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1781, 276 N.E.2d 718. 
15 See Zaltma.n v. Board of Appeals, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 755, 258 N.E.2d 
565. 
16 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1782, 276 N.E.2dat 720, citing MacGibbon v. 
Board of Appeals, 356 Mass. 635, 639, 255 N.E.2d 347, 350 (1970) and Gulf 
Oil Corp. v. Board of Appeals, 355 Mass. 275, 277, 244 N.E.2d 311, 313 (1969). 
§22.12. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1405, 285 N.E.2d 436. 
2 The case also involved appeal of special pennit grants. See text accompanying 
notes 13-14, infra. 
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wise" for the developer.3 In addition, the trial judge determined that the 
variance in question would not substantially derogate from the zoning 
by-law purpose nor would it be substantially detrimental to the public 
good. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court's ruling. 
In Johnson v. Board of Appeals of Wareham,4 plaintiff challenged 
a decision to grant a variance permitting a religious congregation to alter 
the use of its church. The congregation had sought, and was granted, a 
variance to convert its church, located in a residential zone, into office 
suites. On appeal to the superior court, the board's grant was sustained, 
the trial judge finding that conversion to residential purposes was a less 
economically viable alternative than conversion to office space. The 
Supreme Judicial Court sustained the variance grant,5 holding that the 
hardships incident to any other disposition of the property justified the 
variance: "The hardship in not being able reasonably to use this unusual, 
if not unique, and substantial 'existing building' ... for any permitted 
purpose brings the case within authorities [allowing variances because 
conversion to meet applicable zoning strictures was less economically 
feasible than conversion to some other use6], rather than cases [which 
rigidly define what sort of hardship will justify a variance7]." 
These two cases suggest a growing judicial hospitality to economic 
arguments in the determination of hardship. The denial of a variance 
would not have rendered the locus worthless in either the Johnson or the 
Josephs case. In Johnson, the church site could have been renovated for 
residential purposes, albeit at much greater expense.8 In Josephs, although 
it may have been "dangerous" to have too steep a driveway slope, the 
developers could have been required to sacrifice some floor area in order 
to conform to the loading bay height requirements. Clearly, the standard 
3 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1408, 285 N.E.2d at 438, stating one of the criteria 
required by G.L., c. 40A, § 15, cl. 3. 
4 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 56, 277 N.E.2d 695 (Rescript Opinion). 
5 Although the entire Court agreed with the trial judge's finding "that the 
variance 'could be granted without substantial detriment to the public good' or 
substantial derogation from the purpose of the by-law," only a majority of the 
justices agreed with his conclusion that the situation presented to the congrega-
tion involved a "hardship." Id. at 56, 277 N.E.2d at 696. 
6 Id. citing Dion v. Board of Appeals, 344 Mass. 547, 551-552, 183 N.E.2d 
479, 482 (1962) and Sherman v. Board of Appeals, 354 Mass. 133, 134-136, 
235 N.E.2d 800, 801-03 (1968). Id. 
7 Id. citing Bouchard v. Ramos, 346 Mass. 423, 426, 193 N.E.2d 691, 692 
(1963); McLaughlin v. Rockland Zoning Board of Appeals, 351 Mass. 678, 683, 
223 N.E.2d 521, 524-25 (1967); and Garfield v. Board of Appeals, 356 Mass. 
37, 40-41, 247 N.E.2d 720, 722 (1969). 
8 "To demolish the church would cost about $1,500. The vacant lot then 
would be worth about $3,000. The approximate cost of renovating the church 
for dwelling use (exclusive of land cost) would be $20,000 for a single residence 
and $42,000 for two apartments. Three office suites could be put in the building 
for about $26,000. There was evidence that the locus would then be worth about 
$45,000." 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 56, 277 N.E.2d at 696. 
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of economic hardship applied in both cases was substantial and not 
total loss. 
In a third variance case, Kelloway v. Board of Appeal of Melrose,9 
the Melrose Housing Authority sought variances to permit construction 
of a high-rise elderly housing facility in a residential area. Although 
the variance requests were grossly inconsistent with the general tenor of 
the city's zoning ordinance, the board granted the authority's petition. 
The board's action stemmed largely from the faot that further delays 
in completing the project would jeopardize state funding and result in 
a concomitant forfeiture of sizeable development costs already expended 
by the city. The board noted in its decision that the variances would 
not have been granted if the applicant had been a private developer 
instead of an agency charged with carrying out public and governmental 
functions. Nonetheless, the board admitted 'that its determination in this 
case was fraught with irregularities and that, if fiscal exigencies had not 
required precipitous action, the public purpose to be served by this 
facility could have been more properly accomplished: "'it would have 
been more appropriate for the board of aldermen to [have] revise[ d] the 
zoning ordinances to exempt property [owned by the authority from] ... 
the zoning laws.' "10 
All challenges to the board's proceedings were dismissed by the su-
perior court. l1 On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court considered two 
unique rssues: (1) the propriety of the variance under the special Melrose 
zoning statute, and (2) the need for special remedies in cases involving 
public projects. At the time the variances in question were being con-
sidered by the Melrose board, tha:t board was operating pursuant to its 
own enabling act. 12 Even though this special legislation provided for a 
variance-granting procedure "more flexible" than that allowed under 
the state Zoning Enabling Act, G.L., c. 40A, §15, the Court held that 
the variances still conflicted with the general purpose of the Melrose 
zoning ordinance and, accordingly, should not have been granted.13 But 
9 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 399, 280 N.E.2d 160. 
10 Id. at 403, 280 N.E.2d at 164. 
11 Plaintiffs brought two actions, a petition for a writ of certiorari and a bill 
in equity under G.L., c. 40A, §21, to obtain review of the board's decision. In 
Fairman v. Board of Appeal, 331 Mass. 160, 117 N.E.2d 829 (1954) it was stated 
that, because the special enabling act under which the Melrose board was con-
stituted contained no provision for appeall to the superior court, a petition for a 
writ of certiorari was the appropriate method of obtaining review of that board's 
decision. Since a 1954 revision to the general zoning enabling act followed the 
Fairman decision and thereby cast some doubt upon the applicability of the 
Fairman ruling to subsequent appeals of the Melrose board's decisions, plaintiffs 
also opted to pursue a remedy by bill in equity pursuant to G.L., c. 40A, §21. In 
Kelloway, the court resolved this gray area by reiterating the Fairman holding 
that the sole remedy to be used in appealing a decision of the Melrose board is 
certiorari. 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 400 n.2, 280 N.E.2d at 162 n.2. 
12 Acts of 1924, c. 22, repealed by Acts of 1971, c. 598. 
13 The Court stated that, had construction not proceeded on the project, the 
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by the time the case was heard and decided by the Supreme Judicial 
Court, the project had been completed and occupied. Inasmuch as 
demolition would "frustrate the [project's] public purpose" and waste 
the large public expenditure that had financed it, the Court stated that 
a form of relief more flexible than that which is usually employed in 
zoning appeal cases would have to be fashioned.14 Accordingly, the 
Court agreed that plaintiffs' request for an assessment of damages would 
be the only practicable remedy. However, the damages would be re-
coverable only in the event that the Melrose Board of Aldermen failed 
within eight months to pass an ordinance exempting this project from 
the provisions of the zoning ordinance. IS 
Finally, in Broderick v. Board of Appeal of Boston,16 the Supreme 
Judicial Court considered two issues that arose from the appeal of 
variances granted to the Faulkner Hospital Corporation by the Boston 
Board of Appeals: (1) the scope of the bonding requirement under the 
special Boston zoning statute,l' and (2) the propriety of a variance which 
permitted a hospital to construct a replacement facility and a motor 
vehicle garage which did not conform to zoning by-laws. Plaintiffs, in-
habitants of the residential district in which the hospital is located, 
brought two actions contesting the board's decision to grant the two 
variances requested by the hospital.18 The special Boston zoning statute 
requires that any person who appeals a decision of the board of appeal 
must file a bond sufficient to discourage "frivolous and vexatious" appeals 
of that board's decision.19 Shortly after the suits were filed, plaintiffs 
were ordered to file a $1,000,000 appeal bond. This order was subsequently 
amended to require only a $50,000 bond. Later, following the decision 
of Damaskos v. Board of Appeal (which stated that the amount ef such 
bonds sheuld net be such as to. discourage meritorious appeals) ,20 plain-
tiffs' bend requirement was further reduced to $5,000 and remained at 
that level during the trial on the merits. On the day when a final decree 
en the merits could have been entered, the two actions by new having 
board's decision to grant the variance would have been set aside on petition for 
writ of certiorari. 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 405, 280 N.E.2d at 165. 
14 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 405-06, 280 N.E.2d at 165. 
15 Because certiorari stilI remained as the sole remedy for appealing decisions 
of the Melrose board (see note 11, supra) and the bin in equity brought under 
G.L., c. 40A, §21 was unavailing as a remedy, the Court granted plaintiffs 
leave to amend the petition for a writ of certiorari and submit in place thereof 
a bill in equity for declaratory relief under G.L., c. 231A. 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
at 406, 280 N.E. 2d at 165. 
16 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 633, 280 N.E.2d 670. 
17 Acts of 1956, c. 665. 
18 Both actions were commenced by bill of complaint pursuant to Acts of 1956, 
c. 665, § 11. 
19 Acts of 1956, c. 665, § 11. 
20 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1201, 1215, 261 N.E.2d 336, 346, noted'in 1971 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §17.2. 
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been consolidated, the trial court entered an interlocutory order re-
quiring that plaintiffs replace the $5,000 bond with a $100,000 bond as 
a prerequisite to the entry of a final decree. The order further stipulated 
that, if this increased bond were not filed, plaintiffs' bills would be dis-
missed, thus precluding further direct review on the merits by the Su-
preme Judicial Court. Because plaintiffs refused to meet this increased 
bond requirement, the suits were dismissed. 
Plaintiffs appealed this procedural outcome,21 contending that the 
trial court's action in increasing the bond amount prior to entry of final 
decree was contrary to the purpose underlying the statutory bond re-
quirement. The Court agreed with this contention, and stated that it 
was erroneous to require the posting of additional surety as a condition 
to the entry of the final decree since there had been a full hearing and 
the case was "ripe for entry of a final decree on the merits."22 Once 
such a full hearing has been held, the legislative purpose promoting the 
bonding requirement, namely, the discouragement of "frivolous and 
vexatious" appeals, has been accomplished and any increase in bond is 
without purpose. However, the Court warned that this aspect of the 
Broderick ruling "should not be construed as conferring on an appellant 
from a final decree in the Superior Court in a zoning case an absolute 
right to appeal to [the Supreme Judicial Court] without filing a surety 
bond."23 Since the statutory rules generally governing equity appeals24 
also apply to appeals to the Supreme Judicial Court under the Boston 
zoning law, plaintiffs appealing from a superior court final decree may 
be ordered by a justice of the superior court or the Supreme Judicial 
Court to post a surety bond in any amount.25 
Having determined that the superior court erred in dismissing plain-
tiffs' suits, the Court proceeded to consider the merits of the issues raised 
in plaintiffs' appeal of the board's decision. Plaintiffs argued that the 
board exceeded its authority in granting the variances because the vari-
ances would cause " 'substantial detriment to the public good and [a sub-
stantial derogation] from the intent and purpose of the Boston Zoning 
Code.' "26 However, the Court concluded that the variances not only 
met the minimum conditions required for the grant of variances but, 
indeed, advanced the purposes underlying the statute. The Court said: 
21 G.L., c. 214, §19. 
22 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 635, 280 N.E.2d at 673. 
23 Id. at 636, 280 N.E.2d at 673. 
24 G.L., c. 214, §§19-28. 
25 G.L., c. 214, §§22. The factors which may be considered in fixing the amount 
of a surety bond are enumerated in Damaskos v. Board of Appeal, note 20, supra. 
26 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 638, 280 N.E.2d at 674. Plaintiffs also maintained 
that there were "'no conditions especially affecting the locus, but not affecting 
generally the zoning district in which it is situated, which would make the literal 
enforcement of the provisions of the [Boston] Zoning Code a hardship upon the 
locus or the ... Faulkner HospitaL'" A literal enforcement of the zoning code 
would require that a subdivision for residential housing be constructed on the 
locus. 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 637, 280 N.E.2d at 674. 
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"The fears of neighbors as to property values and traffic congestion, 
where the evidence is conflicting on these points, cannot override the 
health needs of the larger community."27 This opinion reflects the same 
special balancing of public and private interests which was noted above 
in discussion of Kelloway and the Court's deference to public interest in 
both cases should be carefully noted for future reference. 
27 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 639, 280 N.E.2d at 675-76. 
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